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MARCH-APRIL, 1962
ONE YEAR REVIEW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS
By HOMER CLARK*
The cases reviewed in this article were decided between Janu-
ary 1, 1961, and December 31, 1961. A relatively large number of
domestic relations opinions by the Colorado Supreme Court during
this period paralleled its generally greater output of cases. Most of
the domestic relations cases were concerned with the financial and
property aspects of divorce and separation. No sharp departures
from prior law were noted, but some of the cases did deal with
interesting legal questions.
I. COMMON LAW MARRIAGE
The Colorado law of common law marriage took a new turn
with In re Peterson's Estate.' This was a petition to determine heir-
ship, in which the contestants were the alleged widow and the col-
lateral relatives of the deceased. The deceased and his wife had
been divorced, but during the interlocutory period had resumed
cohabitation. She relied upon this resumption of cohabitation to
support her claim of common law marriage, a claim which was
rejected by the trial court. On appeal the supreme court reversed
on the ground that the trial court had misapplied the standards for
weighing the evidence of common law marriage. Rather than the
usual rule, which was stated by the trial court to be that common
law marriage must be proved by convincing and positive evidence,
the supreme court held that a special rule should be applied to
common law remarriage. The common law remarriage need only
be proved by evidence which is less than convincing and positive.
How much less convincing the evidence may be is not stated.2 This
doctrine, the vagueness of which is probably unavoidable, is said
to rest upon the general policy favoring remarriage of divorced per-
sons, and upon the Pennsylvania authorities 3 which have taken the
same position. Why remarriage should be socially more acceptable
than marriage remains a mystery.
II. ANNULMENT
Young v. Colorado National Bank4 dealt with the nature of
annulment and the procedure to be used in deciding annulment
cases. This was a suit by a husband to annul his marriage on the
ground of mental incompetency.5 Trial was had to a jury, but during
the proceedings the trial judge ruled that the jury would be ad-
visory only. The jury found for the husband, and the court entered
a decree of annulment. On appeal various errors were alleged. Those
within the scope of this article were as follows: (a) Was the case
properly triable by jury or by advisory jury only? (b) Is the mar-
riage invalid where the statutory blood test is not obtained? (c)
What is the standard of proof in annulment cases?
* Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Low.
1 365 P.2d 254 (Colo. 1961).
2 Unfortunately the court does not say what the evidence of common law marriage was, so
that we cannot evaluate the extent to which the presumption favoring common law remarriage
will go in specific cases.
3 The leading case is In re Wagner's Estate, 398 Pa. 531, 159 A.2d 495 (1960).
4 365 P.2d 701 (Colo. 1961).




The first question was answered by a holding that the case
was triable by jury. The court discussed the nature of annulment
at some length, and concluded that it is a statutory action in which
the trial court exercises equity powers. This is about as satisfactory
a characterization as can be made upon the basis of some very con-
fusing precedents.6 It amounts to a holding that the court in annul-
ment cases must act in accordance with statute, but where the
statutes are silent, general doctrines of equity control. The annul-
ment statute in force in Colorado until the 1957 amendments made
this explicit, 7 the only question being whether the amendments
changed the law.
The court then went on to hold that under Rules 38 (a) and
39 (c) 8 the trial of a non-jury case to a jury with consent of both
parties and the trial judge is a jury trial in the usual sense, resulting
in a verdict which is binding and not merely advisory. This con-
struction of Rule 39 (c) is in accord with the literal wording of the
corresponding federal rule 9 wording which for some reason was
omitted from the Colorado rule. Jury trial in annulment cases may
now be had as a matter of right.10
On the second question, the court held that non-compliance
with the statutory requirement of a blood test does not invalidate
the marriage. The authorities seem to agree on this point" on the
theory that the blood test requirement is directory rather than
mandatory. One may approve the result without being impressed
by the reasoning. So long aq Colorado recognizes the validity of
common law marriage, it cannot, logically invalidate marriages for
failure to comply with licensing or blood test statutes.
The court answered the third question by holding that in an-
nulment cases the "preponderance of the evidence" rule is inappli-
cable and that the plaintiff must prove his case by "clear and con-
vincing" evidence. It is not clear why this should be so, although
there is support for it in the cases. 1" In any event the distinction
between evidence which merely preponderates and evidence which
is clear and convincing is probably so vague as to make the choice
of verbal formula an academic matter.
A further interesting question was raised but not discussed by
the Young case. The plaintiff husband died after the trial court had
granted the annulment but before the case was decided on appeal.
Under the applicable statute marriages of incompetents are only
voidable, not void. 13 In other jurisdictions the death of a plaintiff
before a final decree in an action to annul a voidable marriage
6 Leading cases include Burtis v. Burtis, 1 Hopk. Ch. R. 557 (N.Y. 1825) and Wightman v.
Wightman, 4 Johns. Ch. R. 343 (N.Y. 1820), the latter case being written by Chancellor Kent. See
aIso 2 Bishop, Marriage and Divorce § 294 (6th ed. 1880), and Lyannes v. Lyannes, 171 Wis. 381,
177 N.W. 683 (1920).
7 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 46-3-2 (1953) provided- "Grounds for Annulment.-Actions for annulment
may be maintained upon the following grounds: (1) Upon the ground set forth in section 46-3-1,
providing the party seeking such annulment is under the age of nineteen years at the time of the
institution of the suit. (2) In such other cases as ore recognized in equity."
S Colo. R. Civ. P. 38 (a), 39"(c).
0 Fed. R. Civ. P. 39 (c) contains the following language not found in the Colorado Rule- " .
whose verdict has the same effect as if trial by jury had been a matter of right."
1(0 Colo. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 115, § 1.
I1 Note, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 309 (1939).
12 E.g., Rathburn v. Rathburn, 138 Cal.App.2d 568, 292 P.2d 274 (1956) (annulment for fraud);
Godfrey v. Shatwell, 38 N.J.Super. 501, 119 A.2d 479 (1955) (annulment for impotence). Some caution
should be exercised in generalizing here, since the care with whch the evidence is scrutinized may
vary with the grounds al eged.
13 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 46-3-1 (7) (Supp. 1960).
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abates the action.14 A similar rule governs divorce actions.15 Wheth-
er the fact that death occurred pending appeal rather than trial
should make a difference in result ought to depend upon the prac-
tical consequences. In the Young case a refusal to abate the action
might result in the wife being unable to inherit. It would seem
desirable generally to honor her claim as against the claims of col-
lateral relatives, and therefore a rule which would abate the action
should be preferred. It is unfortunate that this question was not
discussed in the court's opinion.
16
III. DIVORCE: GROUNDS AND PROCEDURE
A single case, Poos v. Poos,17 dealt with grounds for divorce in
1961. It held that when the divorce case is submitted to the jury,
(as it now may be as a matter of right on the demand of either
party)"' the court must give instructions defining the statutory
grounds for divorce. In this case the ground relied on was cruelty
and the supreme court said that the charge should be sufficiently
clear to enable a layman not acquainted with the technicalities of
law to understand both the relevant facts and the controlling legal
principles. This holding seems proper, but it is regrettable that the
court did not go on to indicate just how the offense of cruelty should
have been defined, since the law of Colorado is not exactly crystal
clear in that respect. 19
Two questions of divorce procedure were decided by Kaminsky
v. Kaminsky;20 first that the defense of res judicata resting on a
prior decree of divorce could be raised by a motion for summary
judgment, and second that personal service on an adjudicated in-
sane defendant was sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction under
an earlier version of the statute.21 Such service would not be suffi-
14 E.g., Merrick v. Merrick, 314 Ill. App. 623, 42 N.E.2d 341 (1942); Dibble v. Meyer, 203 Ore.
541, 278 P.2d 901 (1955). See also Patey v. Peaslee, 99 N.H. 335, 111 A.2d 194 (1955) and other
cases cited in Annot., Right to Attack Validity of Marriage After Death of Party Thereto, 47 A.L.R.2d
1393 (1956), and 1 Armstrong, California Family Law 83-84 (1953).
15 Cases are collected in Annots., 158 A.L.R. 1205 (1945), and 104 A.L.R. 654 (1936).
16 The question appears not to have been raised in the briefs on either side. Briefs for Plaintiff
in Error, Brief for Defendant in Error, Young v. Colorado National Bank, 365 P.2d 701 (Colo. 1961).
17 359 P.2d 3 (Colo. 1961).
18 Colo. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 115, § 1.
19 Compare Carroll v. Carroll, 135 Colo. 379, 311 P.2d 709 (1957), with Reed v. Reed, 138 Colo.
74, 379 P.2d 633 (1958).
20 359 P.2d 675 (Colo. 1961).
21 Colo. Stat. Ann. ch. 56, § 4 (1935).
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cient under the statute now in force, 22 which requires service on
the insane person, on his conservator if any, and on a guardian
ad litem who must be appointed by the court.
IV. PROPERTY, ALIMONY AND SUPPORT
Kaminsky v. Kaminsky23 held that a wife may bring suit to
have her property rights adjudicated after her husband has obtained
a divorce, where the property rights were not adjudicated in the
divorce action. This result was reached even though the wife had
been personally served in the divorce action. The case seems to be
in accord with similar cases in other jurisdictions.
2 4
The familiar principle that the amount of alimony or property
awards rests within the discretion of the trial court was again
adhered to by the court.25 This was qualified in one case2 6 by the
rule that the trial court must base its award on conditions existing
at the time of the hearing. It was held error to grant an award
based on an order made in a prior divorce action some ten years
before. In arriving at an equitable division of property it may be
necessary to rely upon the testimony of an appraiser, but Bournakis
v. Bournakis27 held that where the appraiser is appointed by the
court, the parties are entitled to present their own evidence of
value and to cross-examine the court's appraiser.
The enforcement and modification of alimony orders came up
in three cases. In the first of these 28 the court restated the view
that the acquittal or conviction, in contempt proceedings, of one
charged with non-compliance with an alimony decree is within the
sound discretion of the trial court, to be reversed only for an abuse
of that discretion. In the same case it was held that accrued and
unpaid installments due under the alimony decree cannot be can-
celed or modified. The effect of this is that although contempt may
not lie to enforce the payment of such installments, they remain
represented by a valid final judgment which may be enforced in
the same manner as any judgment at law. The second case 29 like-
wise refused to approve modification of past installments, and fur-
ther held that the emancipation of a child does not automatically
affect the amount due under the alimony decree. If the father
wishes he may move to modify the decree on this ground, but until
the motion is heard and granted, his liability remains unaffected.
The third case, 30 involving separate maintenance rather than di-
vorce, held that modification of the alimony order cannot be granted
unless a motion seeking that remedy is filed. In this case the wife
sought to enforce the order by contempt proceedings. The trial
court, finding that the amount required was so large as to be in-
equitable, reduced it. The supreme court reversed, saying that on
the case before it the trial court's only function was to decide
22 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 46-1-2 (3) (Supp. 1960).
23 Supro note 20.
24 2 Freemen, Judgments § 912 (5th ed. 1925). The present statute enacts the some rule. Colo.
Rev. Stat. § 46-1-5 (4) (Supp. 1960).
25 Walden v. Walde,,. 363 P.2d 168 (Colo. 1961); Samuelson v. Samuelson, 360 P.2d 451 (Colo.
1961); Traynor v. Trayjr, 360 P.2d 431 (Colo. 1961). See also Flor v. Flor, 366 P.2d 664 (Colo.
1961).
26 Boyer v. Boyer, 366 P.2d 661 (Colo. 1961).
27 361 P.2d 438 (Colo. 1961).
28 Enolemon v. Englemon, 358 P.2d 864 (Colo. 1961).
29 Taylor v. Taylor, 362 P.2d 1027 (Colo. 1961).
30 Lopez v. Lopez, 366 P.2d 373 (Colo. 1961).
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whether or not the defendant was in contempt. It could have held
him not in contempt due to his inability to pay, but it could not
reduce the payments. This case seems to place a disproportionate
weight upon matters of form, since the court concedes that on the
facts shown the defendant could have had the payments reduced
if he had proceeded in the proper way.
The case of Scheer v. District Court3' determined an interesting
question of jurisdiction under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement
of Support Act. 32 (This statute was amended by the General As-
sembly in 1961).33 The Scheer case held that an ex-wife could ini-
tiate an action for support of the children under the statute not-
withstanding the fact that a divorce action had been brought in
Colorado, and a decree of divorce granted with a reservation of
jurisdiction over the custody and support of the children. The
grounds for the decision were two: (a) the children and their
mother having left Colorado, the divorce court had no jurisdiction
as to custody and support; and (b) under the Reciprocal Act and by
general equity principles jurisdiction over custody and support of
children exists separately from the divorce action.
A single case involving criminal non-support, Pacheco v. Peo-
ple,34 held that an indigent defendant in such cases is entitled to
have a transcript of testimony furnished to him free of charge, and
also to have a court reporter so that such a transcript may be made.
Although it may be outside the scope of this article, notice
should here be taken of the amendment to the desertion and non-
support laws enacted in 196135 which authorizes the clerk of the
district court to review alimony and child support orders, on his
own motion to send notices of non-payment, and to request the
district judge to issue contempt citations when payments are in
arrears. This procedure is only authorized where the clerk of the
district court has received written consent to take such steps both
from the attorney for the plaintiff and from the plaintiff herself.
The statute applies to payments ordered either in divorce, separate
maintenance or annulment decrees.
Two cases in 1961 decided questions relating to attorney fees
in divorce actions. One of these, Stockham v. Stockham, 36 held that
the defendant husband could be required to pay his wife's attorney
fees even though the parties had become reconciled and resumed
cohabitation. The court said that under these circumstances the
divorce action was still pending and the trial court had not been
divested of jurisdiction. The other case, Tower v. Tower,37 ordered
the husband to pay the wife's attorney a specified fee, notwith-
standing the fact that the attorney was not a party to the action.
The court said that this result prevented multiplicity of suits, and
31 363 P.2d 1059 (Colo. 1961). Another case of minor interest, Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 367
P.2d 594 (Colo. 1961), held that appropriate relief by way of support of children should be granted
notwithstanding that the plaintiff had erroneously relied on the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement
of Support Act.
32 Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 43-2-1 to 43-2-16 (1953).
33 Colo. Sess. Laws 1961 ch. 114, § 1, repealing Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 43-2-1 to 43-2-16 (1953), and
enacting a new statute in its place.
34 360 P.2d 975 (Colo. 1961).
35 Colo. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 113, § 2.
36 358 P.2d 1026 (Colo. 1961).
37 364 P.2d 565 (Colo. 1961).
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that the attorney would be treated as an intervenor even though he
had not filed a petition for intervention. The contrast is striking
between this case, with its willingness to sweep aside technical
matters to determine the merits of the case, and the Lopez case 88
which insisted upon the observance of procedural technicalities.
One additional item of interest in the Tower case is its mention of
the fact that the parties to the divorce action made an agreement
by which, in exchange for certain concessions, the husband prom-
38 Lopez v. Lopez, Supra note 30.
SYMBOL
MODERN LIVING
When you visit a home that bears the
Medallion symbol, you can be sure
that it is modern electrically
in every way:





ised not to contest the divorce.39 Such contracts have been univer-
sally held collusive in other states,40 but the supreme court was
apparently not troubled by this element of the case.
V. CUSTODY
The troublesome question of jurisdiction over the custody of
children, already much confused in Colorado as in other states, was
not much clarified by 1961's crop of cases. One case, Wiggins v.
Miller,41 refused to enforce a Kansas custody order on the ground
that it was void for lack of due process. It is not clear precisely
where due process was violated, the court speaking at one point
of lack of notice, and at another of lack of a hearing. On the court's
own showing the child's father had notice, so the real objection
probably was that there was no hearing. A second case, Kraudel v.
Benner,42 enforced a foreign custody order, in this instance one
entered in Illinois, where the mother had kept the child in Colorado
in violation of the Illinois decree. Apparently the enforcement here
was by way of comity only, the court not mentioning full faith and
credit. The only difficulty with the case is that the Illinois divorce
decree was given without personal service upon the mother. May v.
Anderson 43 (not cited by the court) would say that such a decree
is not entitled to full faith and credit. The defect of lack of service
may have been cured, however, by the fact that the mother per-
sonally appeared in the Illinois modification proceeding, and it was
the modified decree which was being enforced against her in this
action.
A third case contains dictum that the Colorado courts lose
jurisdiction over the custody of a child when his domicile is changed
to another state.44 This indicates a disposition to apply the same
rule to jurisdiction over custody in Colorado which has in the past
been applied by Colorado courts to custody orders originating in
other states.4  The rule is otherwise in many other states.46
The most important custody case decided this year was Lopez
v. Smith.47 The facts in the case were that the parents of the child
in question had left the child with Sara Lopez for fourteen years.
At the end of that time the child was forcibly removed by the par-
ents. An adoption proceeding was then begun by Sara Lopez in the
County Court of Conejos County where she sought a writ of habeas
corpus to regain custody of the child. The child's parents then
sought a writ of prohibition from the supreme court forbidding the
county court to hear the habeas corpus case.
The writ of prohibition was granted on the ground that the
county court lacked jurisdiction to hear the habeas corpus petition.
39 Tower v. Tower, 364 P.2d 565, 567 (Colo. 1961).
40 The authorities are collected in Clark, Separation Agreements, 28 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 149, 158
(1956). Perhaps the definition of collusion now found in the Colorado divorce statute does not
include agreements not to defend. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 46-1-4 (1) (d) (Supp. 1960).
41 360 P.2d 111 (Colo. 1961).
42 366 P.2d 667 (Cola. 1961).
43 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
44 Scheer v, District Court, 363 P.2d 1059, 1060 (Colo. 1961): ... when a child's domicile is
changed he is no longer subject to the control of the court which first awarded his custody."
45 Hodgen v. Byrne, 105 Colo. 410, 98 P.2d 1000 (1940); People ex rel. Wagner v. Torrence, 94
Colo. 47, 27 P.2d 1038 (1933).
46 E.g., People ex rel. Koelsch v. Rone, 3 111.2d 483, 121 N.E,2d 738 (1954); Haney v. Knight,
197 Md. 212, 78 A.2d 643 (1951).
47 360 P.2d 967 (Colo. 1961). It is noteworthy that a similar case arose in 1958, except that there
the mother sought habeas corpus. The supreme court there held habeas corpus would lie. Johnson
v. Block, 137 Colo. 119, 332 P.2d 99 (1958).
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Although the basis for this decision is not clear, it seems to reside
in the following: "In the absence of a right to custody based on an
adjudication decreeing adoption on one of the statutory grounds
or on a finding of dependency under that statute, a third person,
which the respondent here apparently is, may not maintain a habeas
corpus action seeking an award of custody of a child as against the
child's natural parents upon an allegation of prior abandonment
by the parents. '48 At another place in the opinion the court states
flatly that "a stranger lacks standing to maintain habeas corpus
looking to an award of custody as against the parents of the child
who are presumed to be entitled to the custody."49 This carries the
so-called parental right theory to its ultimate conclusion, making it
a fixed rule of procedure. It seems to mean that in any case in which
a parent is able to kidnap a child from a non-parent, no matter how
long the non-parent may have had custody, and no matter how dis-
astrous it may be for the child's welfare, the non-parent has no
remedy because he has no standing to bring habeas corpus.
A thorough criticism of the Lopez case would take this review
far beyond its appropriate space limits. Nevertheless the case is so
destructive of principles which have been laid down for the protec-
tion of children that some of its more obvious errors should be
pointed out. In the first place habeas corpus is the remedy par ex-
cellence for the decision of disputes over custody, originating in the
English common law and being well established in the United States
for over a hundred years, entirely apart from statute. 0 The Colo-
rado statute which refers to it is not the one cited in the Lopez
case,51 but is another section 52 which recognizes the action in general
terms and which does not exclude strangers as parties.
Second, in habeas corpus the question is not one of "legal right"
or "prima facie right," but of the child's welfare.53 When that ques-
tion arises in disputes between parents and non-parents the parents
have an advantage, but so far as the writer is aware there is no
rule of jurisdiction which says that the non-parent cannot even
contest the parent's physical possession of the child.54 The contrary
has been the rule ever since the leading case of Chapsky v. Wood 55
awarded custody of a child to the child's aunt as against the claim
of a parent. The factor of which party is the movant in the habeas
48 360 P.2d 967, 969-70 (Colo. 1961).
49 360 P.2d 967, 969 (Colo. 1961). Presumably "stranger" means a non-parent.
50 The leading case in the arigin and history of this use of habeus corpus is New York Foundling
Hospital v. Gatti, 203 U.S. 429 (1906).
51 The court relies upon Colo. Rev. Stat.§ 65-1-20 (1953), authorizing the county courts to issue
habeas corpus in certain circumstances.
52 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 65-1-2 (1953).
53 New York Foundling Hospital v. Gatti, 203 U.S. 429, 439 (1906); Commonwealth ex rel.
Children's Aid Soc'y v. Gard, 362 Pa. 85, 66 A.2d 300 (1949); Morris v. Jackson, 66 Wyo. 369, 212
P.2d 78 (1949). A small minority of jurisdictions limits the inquiry in habeas corpus to the "legal
right" of the parties, but the overwhelming weight of authority is the other way, as are common
sense and ordinary humanity. Ohio, for example, seems to follow the minority view. See May v.
Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953). Kentucky may also, though 'its cases are in conflict. Compare
Chamblee v. Chamblee, 248 S.W.2d 422 (Ky. 1952) with Shippen v. Bailey, 303 Ky. 10, 196 S.W.2d
425 (1946). Colorado has formerly adopted the majority view. Devlin v. Huffman, 139 Colo. 417,
339 P.2d 1008 (1959) awarded custody to a stranger who had had the child a shorter time than
Lopez, as against the claim of a parent.
54 The leading case of Pukas v. Pukas, 129 W.Va. 765, 42 S.E.2d 11, 13 (1947) grants habeas
corpus to a grandmother as against the child's mother, saying among other things: " . . . the
procedure is different where the custody of an infant is concerned. Habeas corpus then becomes
like unto a chancery proceeding in rem, with the child as the res .... The welfare of the child is
the outstandingly paramount question and the proceeding is addressed to the sound discretion of
the court . . . . The court is not bound by any particular rule to deliver to any particular claimant
the custody involved, the law recognizing no absolute right to a child's custody .... "
55 26 Kan. 650, 40 Am. Rep. 321 (1881) (per Brewer, J.). See also Morris v. Jackson, 66 Wyo.
369, 212 P.2d 78 (1949).
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corpus petition is entirely unimportant. The result in the Chapsky
case would have been no different if the aunt had sought habeas
corpus, since there also the court would have looked at the child's
welfare in deciding who should have custody. If strangers may be
given custody as against a parent when the parent seeks habeas
corpus, the result should be the same where the strangers seek
habeas corpus. Any other result rewards the parent who seizes the
child by force.56
Finally, a notable feature of the Lopez opinion is its complete
omission of any regard for the child's welfare. In a dictum toward
the close, 57 it suggests that the child's presence before the county
court in the adoption proceeding could be obtained by a writ of
habeas corpus ad testificandum. This exhibits a misunderstanding
of this case and of the remedy of habeas corpus, since much more
was at stake than the child's testimony in the adoption proceeding.
In this case the petition for habeas corpus alleged that the child was
being mistreated and abused. Whether that allegation could be
proved or not is the crucial issue. The petitioner should have been
allowed to prove it if she could, since if proved, the state should
56 This is the effect achieved by the Lopez case. Johnson v. Black, 137 Colo. 119, 322 P.2d 99
(1958) held that where the child remains in the custody of the foster parent, who has filed an
adoption petition, custody may be adjudicated on habeas corpus. Presumably this means that the
court in habeas corpus may determine what the child's welfare requires, weighing among other
factors the claim of the parent qua parent. But now under the Lopez case the parent may avoid
any judicial inquiry into custody whatever by seizing the child.
57 360 P.2d 967, 970 (Colo. 1961),
The subjects most often litigated in Colorado
are covered in detail in the new Am Jur PROOF OF FACTS..
Here you find the actual questions to use in court, all prop-
erly phrased ... questions that will elicit from a witness those
facts that must be established.
PROOF OF FACTS covers hundreds of difficult technical,
medical, and legal subjects that arise in your practice con-
stantly.
See exactly how this new kind of lawbook helps you convince
Colorado juries... helps you win cases. Order volumes 8, 9,
and 10 of PROOF OF FACTS on approval today.
BANCROFT-WHITNEY CO. BENDER-MOSS CO.
301 B r a n na n Street 315 Bran na an Street
San Francisco 19, California. Son Francisco 7, California
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have intervened for the child's welfare. This is the purpose and
function of habeas corpus. But a reading of the Lopez case gives
the impression that the matter is of no more importance than a
dispute over the ownership of a chattel, and that habeas corpus
involves no more poignant human relationships than a writ of
replevin.
The other cases 58 involving custody during 1961 adhered to the
settled rule that custody matters are peculiarly within the trial
court's discretion, one of these 59 relying upon this rule to affirm
the trial court's grant of permission to the child's mother to remove
the child from Colorado upon the condition that the child be re-
turned to Jefferson County for three weeks each spring. The reason
for the removal was the remarriage of the child's mother to a resi-
dent of Missouri.
VI. ADOPTION
The supreme court held, in Mason v. Benson,60 that appeal from
a decree of adoption could not be taken more than fourteen months
from the date of the decree. In the same case it also held that un-
successful petitioners for adoption of the same child in another case
could not appeal, since they were not parties in the case appealed
from.
Another case, Pool v. Harold,6' reiterated the rule that an
adopted child cannot be disinherited by his adoptive father where
the adoption decree recited that the adoptive parents had promised
not to disinherit the child, and where the adoption decree was en-
tered before the enactment in 1941 of the statute62 voiding contracts
not to disinherit adopted children. This rule applies, according to
this case, even though there was no separate contract not to dis-
inherit.
VII. DEPENDENCY
Two dependency cases were decided during the year. In one63
it was held that the married mother of an alleged illegitimate child
had the burden of proving non-access by her husband during the
period when the child was conceived. The case was remanded for
the taking of additional evidence as to the whereabouts of the
husband at the time of conception, evidence which might overcome
the presumption of legitimacy.
The other case, Dalton v. People in Interest of Moors,64 was a
criminal prosecution for non-support of a child. The defendant had
been adjudged the child's father in a prior dependency proceeding
in the juvenile court. The dependency decree was held void in that
defendant's counsel was allowed, to withdraw and the case was then
heard on the very same day. The court said that this violated the
due process clause since it deprived the defendant of notice and an
opportunity to be heard. The decree so given was therefore open
to collateral attack in the criminal prosecution. The result seems
correct on the facts stated.
58 Flor v. For, 366 P.2d 664 (Colo. 1961); Wiederspohn v. Wiederspohn, 361 P.2d 125 (Colo. 1961).
59 Wiederspohn v. Wiederspohn, supra note 58.
60 361 P.2d 349 (Colo. 1961).
61 367 P.2d 592 (Colo. 1961).
62 Colo. Rev. Stat. 1 152-2-4 (1953).
63 Schierenbeck v. Minor. 367 P.2d 333 (Colo. 1961).
64360 P2d 113 (Colo. 1961).
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